Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Liuzm marked it as to-read May 02, Rather, what differentiates these cases is that my happiness and my spontaneous avowal have, we might say, a particular kind of intelligibility.
Knowledbe to PP index Total downloads 20, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 10 50, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Locke, an early inner sense theorist, described the introspective faculty as follows. A pain or itch that is known by acquaintance is grasped through accessible evidence: The first-person authority view diagnoses the authority granted to self-attributions in non-epistemic terms.
Stephen Hetherington – – Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Published January 27th by Routledge first published January 1st Sign in Create an account. Jack rated it liked it Jan 26, Dan Ust rated it really liked it Nov 28, Recently, the idea that thoughts have knowlege distinctive phenomenology has received renewed attention Bayne and Montague ; Kriegel ; see the entry on consciousness and intentionality.
In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Gertler has knack for making all of the distinctions that are necessary for her readers to have a strong grasp of the different positions in the literature on self-knowledge.
One striking feature of the ISA account is its claim that nearly all self-knowledge requires self-interpretation. Refresh and try again. The bypass method is exclusively first-personal, since only I can base a belief directly on my perceptual state. Some philosophers take attitudes to be relational in another way as well, namely geetler attitude contents depend on relations to the environment: Jnowledge Borgoni – – Dialectica 69 1: But as noted in Section 1some philosophers deny that the special character of self-attributions is primarily epistemic.
The core of neo-expressivism is its non-epistemic account of phenomena often associated with self-knowledge, namely, first-person authority.
The accuracy of subject reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports.
Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the results. Juan Viera marked it as to-read Jan 17, Boyle provides a different argument for a Moran-style view.
Constitutivism is, on its face, a very optimistic picture of our access to our own mental states. She has written a book, Privileged Access Brie Gertler is a philosopher who works primarily on problems in the philosophy of the mind. Self-knowledge Brie Gertler No preview available – Added to PP index Total downloads 5, of 36, Recent downloads 6 months 61 5, of 36, How can I increase my downloads?
I found Gertler’s reading of Descartes rather problematic, and This is one of the best textbook for philosophy that I have come across until now, both in content and in the way the book is set up.
Oxford University Press, Wright, C.
Larisa marked it as to-read Oct 03, But the central role played by rationality, in his picture, sharply distinguishes it from the empiricist transparency accounts described in the previous subsection. In noticing these we are preparing ourselves to do something new, namely to describe the frames of mind which these utterances disclose. Self-Knowledge Brie Gertler Limited preview – Andreas Forslund is currently reading it Nov 24, It is metaphysically direct in that no event or process mediates between gert,er awareness and the mental state itself.
Self-Knowledge – Brie Gertler – Google Books
Cameron Kavanaugh marked it as to-read Apr 21, We might speak here of a distinctive logical space in which we locate mental items and their expressions along with the circumstances against whose background they have the significances that they do. One version of this denial charges that by focusing on our access to our mental states, standard accounts of self-knowledge portray the thinker engaged in self-reflection as passive, a mere spectator or detector of a cognitive show.
But the ISA account denies a key assumption of inner sense accounts, namely, that there is a cognitive faculty dedicated specifically to self-knowledge.